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For the five centuries after Pope Gregory VII put ‘libertas 
ecclesiae’ in the center of the debates over the relationship of the 
Church to secular power and authority, much of the conflict within 
the Christian world revolved around one issue: what is the proper 
legal relationship between the ecclesiastical and secular 
institutions. The question that Gregory posed was ‘could laymen 
have any jurisdiction or authority within the Church?’1  By the 
thirteenth century the focus had shifted from the big issue of 
‘Church and State’ to the relationship between the clergy and the 
laity.  The terminology also changed.  ‘Libertas ecclesiastica’ 
replaced ‘libertas ecclesiae’ in the writings of medieval and early 
modern jurists . 
 The ramifications of this change have not yet been studied.  I 
can make a few preliminary remarks about this intriguing 
development in terminology.  Both terms can be traced back to the 
patristic age.  Saint Hilary of Poitiers (Hilarius Pictaviensis) seems 
to have been the first to use ‘libertas ecclesiae’ in his commentary 
on the Psalms.2   Pope Leo the Great was the first to write about 
‘libertas ecclesiastica’ in a letter to Bishop Leo Anatolio about the 
difficulties in Alexandria at the time of the death of the Emperor 
Marcianus.3  ‘Libertas ecclesiae’ was, however, the preferred 
phrase in the early Middle Ages.  In the twelfth century, the Father 
of Canon Law, Gratian, did not include any canons with the phrase 
‘libertas ecclesiae’.  He did include one canon with the phrase 
                                                         
1 Brigitte Szabó-Bechstein, ‘Libertas ecclesiae vom 12. bis zur Mitte des 13. 
Jahrhunders:  Verbreitung und Wandel des Begriffs seit seiner Prägung durch 
Gregor VII.’ Die Abendländische Freiheit vom 10. bis zum 14. Jahrhundert:  
Der Wirkungszusammenhang von Idee und Wirklichkeit im europäischen 
Vergleich, ed. Johannes Fried (Vorträge und Forschungen 39; Sigmaringen 
1991)  147-175. 
2 PL 9.333. 
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‘libertas ecclesiastica’.4  ‘Libertas ecclesiae’ appears in only a 
handful of decretals included in the collections of canon law after 
Gratian.5  With his emphasis on papal monarchy and the 
importance of the Roman church, Pope Innocent III introduced 
‘libertas Romanae ecclesiae’ into a decretal, and the phrase was 
repeated by popes Nicholas III and Boniface VIII in their 
decretals.6 
 If one judges only by the texts in the books of law that were 
taught in the schools and used in the courts, ‘Libertas ecclesiastica’ 
supplanted ‘libertas ecclesiae’ after the twelfth century.  The 
decretal collections from Innocent III’s pontificate and after 
pullulate with ‘libertas ecclesiastica,’ although Raymond de 
Peñafort excised some of the passages containing the phrase in his 
editorial work on the Decretals of Gregory IX.7  Linguistic usages 
and evolutions over time may not be explainable but are 
intriguing. 
 Consequently, in the centuries before the Fifth Lateran Council 
‘libertas ecclesiastica’ had become the touchstone defining the 
relationship between the clergy and the laity.  Pope Innocent III 
embraced the term early in his pontificate.  In 1198 Innocent’s 
curia rendered a decision, Magnae devotionis, that gave a different 
spin on the issue of ecclesiastical liberty.8  Magnae devotionis 
became a key text in canonical jurisprudence for establishing the 
pope’s prerogative to commute crusading vows.  That papal right 
had nothing to do with ecclesiastical liberty.  Although papal 
power became the decretal’s calling card, a bishop’s duty to 
defend the liberty of his church was just as significant.  Garnerius, 
bishop of Troyes, had had a problem.  His church was being 
afflicted by grave but unspecified difficulties that damaged the 
                                                         
4 D.25 c.1; the ‘correctores Romanae’ changed ‘ecclesiastica’ to ‘ecclesia’ for 
reasons that are not clear. 
5 X 2.27.20 (1199) but in the ‘partes decisae’of Raymond de Peñafort and 
consequently unknown to later canonists and VI 5.11.7, in Friedberg’s footnote. 
6 X 5.33.12, VI 1.6.17, 5.7.10, 5.12.2. 
7 The decretals that Raymond shortened and cut out ‘libertas ecclesiastica’ are:  
X 2.1.21, 2.28.25; it was also cut from VI 1.8.2.  Raymond cut ‘libertas 
ecclesiae’ from X 2.27.20. 
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ecclesiastical liberty of his church.  He decided that Henry II of 
Champagne, recently elected the king of Jerusalem, was, as his 
temporal lord,  the only person to whom he could turn.  He and 
some of his clerics made a remarkable decision.  They took a vow 
of pilgrimage to go to the Holy Land and implore Henry to help 
protect the church at Troyes.  When he reached Piacenza, 
Garnerius learned that Henry had died. The main purpose of the 
pilgrimage disappeared.  Garnerius asked Innocent III to commute 
their vows.9  After much complicated argumentation that would 
live on in the jurisprudence governing vows and other decisions 
by corporations, Innocent granted Garnerius and his clerics a 
commutation of their vows.10  Innocent never detailed which rights 
of the church of Troyes were being threatened nor how they were 
endangered nor by whom.  Nevertheless, the decretal remained a 
key text that obligated bishops to petition secular rulers to protect 
diocesan ecclesiastical liberties and rights for centuries.11 
 At the end of his pontificate, Innocent and the Fourth Lateran 
Council promulgated two canons whose contents were based on 
the principle of ecclesiastical liberty.  In Sicut volumus, canon 42, 
he established that laymen should not usurp clerical jurisdiction 
and clerics should respect lay rights.12  In canon 44, Cum laicis, 
                                                         
9 Henry died September 10, 1197.  He had participated in the Third Crusade. 
10 James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader (Madison-
Milwaukee-London 1969) 78-81, 118.  Innocent’s ‘decet, licet, expedit’  that he 
most likely borrowed from Bernard of Clairvaux, De consideratione  3.4.15, 
became a touchstone for making decisions and its principles were carried over 
into many other areas of law; see e.g. Brian Tierney, ‘Hostiensis and 
Collegiality’, Proceedings Toronto 1972 401-409 at 405 citing Hostiensis to X 
3.10.4 or Antonio Augustin, Opera omnia  (Vol. 2; Lucca 1766) 446 to his 
commentary on Justinian’s  ‘De regulis iuris’ 186 (recte 144). 
11 E.g. Emanuele González Téllez, Commentaria perpetua (Venice 1766) to X 
3.34.7 fol. 431:  ‘ex causa episcopum votum emisisse .  .  . ut de libertate 
ecclesiae Trecensis ageret cum comite Campaniae’. 
12 Antonio García y García,  ed. Constitutiones Concilii quarti Lateranensis 
una cum Commentariis glossatorum (MIC Series A: Corpus Glossatorum 2;  
Città del Vaticano 1981) 82-83.  Canon 42 was not accepted into the body of 
canon law: ‘Quod circa universis clericis interdicimus ne quis pretextu 
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Innocent proclaimed a fundamental principle of ecclesiastical 
liberty: the property of churches could not be alienated by laymen.  
Fiefs possessed by a church or all other ecclesiastical properties 
were immune from lay power.13   
 The old issue of immunity of clerics from lay judicial power 
also raised the theme of ecclesiastical liberty.  A decretal of Pope 
Honorius III dealt with Hildebrand, bishop of Fiesole, who had 
been condemned and banned from Florence by a Florentine court 
even though the court had not followed the strict rules of judicial 
procedure when it summoned witnesses outside of the court-
room.14  For that violation of judicial procedure, Honorius revoked 
the secular court’s decision and fined Florence 1000 pounds for 
damaging ecclesiastical liberty.15  As Bernardus Parmensis 
pointed out in his Ordinary Gloss a secular judge may not burden 
a cleric ‘with his law’ and must therefore be considered to have 
committed a sacrilege and violated ecclesiastical liberty.  Because 
of his sacrilege he had been condemned to a monetary fine.16  
Although the facts of the case were complicated, the principle was 
clear: secular rulers and courts had no jurisdiction over clerics. 
 Pope Gregory IX rendered a decision that laymen were 
forbidden to participate in elections held in collegiate churches.  
Gregory declared that even if a lay patron, the prelate, and the 
chapter of the church agreed that the patron could elect a member 
of the chapter, that agreement was not valid.  A layman should not 
possess the right of election because it would be a pernicious 
                                                         
13 4 Comp. 3.5.1 (X 3.13.12).  See also Maria Pia Alberzoni, ‘Innocenzo III e la 
defesa della “libertas ecclesiastica” nei comuni dell’Italia settentrionale’,  
Innocenzo III: Urbs et orbis:  Atti del congresso internazionale, ed. Andrea 
Sommerlechner (2 vols. Nuovi studi storici 55; Rome 2003) 2.837-928, at 838-
839.  
14 5 Comp. 5.11.1 (X 5.36.7).  
15 At the Council of Vienne Pope Clement V again condemned the practice of 
subjecting clergy to the ban in secular courts, Clem. 5.8.1.  See Peter R. 
Pazzaglini, The Criminal Ban of the Sienese Commune 1225-1310 (Quaderni di 
‘Studi senesi’ 45; Milan 1979) and Christian Zendri, Banniti nostri temporis:  
Studi su bando e consuetudine nel diritto comune (Collana della Facoltà di 
Giurisprudenza dell’Università degli Studi di Trento 9; Napoli 2016). 
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example and a loss of ecclesiastical liberty.17  Previous canon law 
gave a patron the right to select a cleric in a church in which he 
had a right of election (ius eligendi).  Later canonists explained 
this contradiction by distinguishing between the right to present a 
candidate and the right to elect.18 
 A significant piece of legislation governing ecclesiastical 
liberty in the Corpus iuris canonici was a mandate of Pope 
Nicholas III in 1280 that he promulgated as a general constitution 
to the entire church.  It was later included in Boniface VIII’s Liber 
sextus.19  At issue was the common practice of swearing oaths to 
uphold the statutes and customs in both the ecclesiastical and 
secular polities by clerics and secular magistrates.  Nicholas 
warned them both that when they take such oaths they should 
always swear that they except all things that are ‘illicit, impossible, 
or contrary to ecclesiastical liberty’.20  Johannes Andreae made 
two points when he discussed the decretal.  First the magistrates 
in charge of promulgating statutes (statutarii) who publish statutes 
contrary to ecclesiastical liberty will be excommunicated if they 
do not delete the offending statutes within two months,21 and 
second, the jurisprudence of the Ius commune should regulate all 
oaths.22  That jurisprudence clearly established that oaths cannot 
bind those who do not know that what they swear to is contrary to 
                                                         
17 X 1.6.51 (ca. 1227-1234). 
18 See the Ordinary Gloss on X 1.6.51 s.v. in laicum and, much later, Emanuele 
Gonzalez Tellez, Commentaria (Venice 1766) vol. 1, pp.. 224-225.  On ‘Ius 
patronatus’ see the fundamental work of Peter Landau, Ius patronatus: Studien 
zur Entwicklung des Patronats im Dekretalenrecht und der Kanonistik des 12. 
und 13. Jahrhunderts (Köln-Wien 1975). 
19 VI 2.11.1, Contingit in nonullis ecclesiis, which was printed from an original 
bull sent to Lübeck, Codex diplomaticus lubecensis, ed. Wilhelm Leverkus (2 
vols. Oldenburg 1856) 1.267-268. 
20 Ibid. 267 ‘qualitercumque et sub quacumque uerborum forma prestita uel 
prestanda ad licita possibilia et libertati ecclesiastice non obuiantia tantum 
extendi’. 
21 Johannes Andreae, Ordinary Gloss (Venice 1476) to VI 2.11.1 s.v. libertati. 
22 Ibid. s.v. Declaramus: ‘Posito tamen quod in genere iuret: fit tamen secundum 
ius commune interpretatio iuramenti, et probatur hoc satis per decretalem supra 
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law.23  Guido de Baysio summed up what constituted ‘libertas 
ecclesiastica’ in a gloss to the same decretal with a quotation taken 
from Pope Innocent IV:24 
Ecclesiastical liberty is contained in privileges in spiritualities and in 
privileges in temporalities.  Again it is found in general privileges 
granted to the church and in each privilege granted to individual 
churches.  
Innocent had listed a number of ecclesiastical liberties in his 
commentary on the Decretals of Gregory IX:  especially the 
church’s freedom to collect tithes, first fruits, and offerings.  He 
repeated the well-established principle that only the clergy can 
exercise authority over the church, and forbade violence against 
clerics.  Innocent noted that ecclesiastical liberty permitted the 
clergy to make testaments with only two witnesses.25 
 Another striking instance of papal legislation occurred in a 
decretal included in the Liber sextus.  Pope Boniface VIII warned 
all lay lords that they should never forbid their subjects from 
selling to or buying goods from clerics or ecclesiastical persons.  
If they presumed to do so, they would damage ecclesiastical liberty 
and would be punished with excommunication.26  Johannes 
Andreae pointed out this is an unusual infringement of 
ecclesiastical liberty but can be explained by understanding that 
the decretal forbade indirect fraud between persons.  He gave the 
example that if one prohibited the transport of material for 
repairing a road, one prohibited the repair and indirectly the right 
to repair.27  He noted that the Italian city states often promulgated 
                                                         
23 Ibid. ‘aut nesciebat <statuta illicita> nec id in mente gerebat.  Et tunc non 
peccavit et solum ad licita obligatur’. 
24 Guido de Baysio, Apparatus ad Sextum (Milan 1490) to VI 2.11.1 s.v. 
ecclesiastice libertati: ‘quod ecclesiastica libertas consistit in privilegiis super 
spiritualibus et in privilegiis super temporalibus.  Item consistit in privilegiis 
generalibus ecclesie concessis et in privilegiis singularibus concessis cuique 
ecclesie quod prosequere, ut plene notatur Innocentius in predicto capitulo 
Noverit (X 5.39.49)’. 
25 Innocent IV, Commentaria (Venice 1495) to X 5.39.49 s.v. libertatem. 
26 VI 3.23.5. 
27 Johannes Andreae, Ordinary Gloss (Venice 1476) to VI 3.23.5 s.v. libertatis, 
the repairing of a road example is given in an addition to his text in his Ordinary 
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statutes that restricted the buying or donating of goods that were 
given to ecclesiastical institutions. 
 ‘Libertas ecclesiastica’ also attracted the attention of jurists 
outside the Corpus iuris canonici.  The earliest treatise on ‘libertas 
ecclesiastica’ that I have found was written by a Portuguese jurist, 
Egas, a canon of the cathedral of  Viseu who became its bishop in 
1288 and died in 1313.28  His tract did not circulate widely.  It is 
preserved in five Iberian manuscripts.29  He probably wrote it ca. 
1300:30 
Because we talk about ecclesiastical liberty frequently, let’s see what 
it is and how we can define it and what the penalties are for those who 
violate it.  Ecclesiastical liberty is the immunity of ecclesiastical 
persons, places and property established by the holy fathers and the 
Catholic princes.  This definition has been established by the Fourth 
Lateran Council’s canon Cum laicis (c.44 = X 3.13.12). 
Egas  was most concerned about violence against clergy as 
attacking a fundamental ecclesiastical liberty.  A text from the 
Second Lateran Council (1139) that Gratian included in his 
Decretum laid down the norm: if a person attacked a cleric he was 
ipso facto excommunicated.  Only the pope could absolve the 
perpetrator.31  Egas added a number of reasons, people, and 
                                                         
Decretals of Gregory IX’, ZRG Kan. Abt. 74 (1988) 328-347 at 346-347;  
Johannes expanded his commentary on this decretal in his Novella in Sextum 
(Lyon: 1550) fol. 99rab, where he noted Italian legislation: ‘Sepe in Italia 
interdicitur per statuta civitatum vel dominorum ne quis vendat vel donet rem 
immobilem alicui non existenti de iurisdictione statuentium vel non subeunti 
onera communium vel dominorum, et irritant venditionem et donationem, et 
infligunt penam ante, scilicet. includantur venditiones vel donationes in 
ecclesiam’. 
28 Antonio García y García, Estudios sobre la canonistica portuguesa medieval 
(Monografias 29; Madrid 1976) 126-127. 
29 Ibid. 249-255.   
30 Ibid. 257.  See also Paulette L. Pepin, ‘The Council of Peñafiel 1302: The 
Castilian Church’s Reassertion of its libertas ecclesiastica’, On the Social 
Origins of Medieval Institutions:  Essays in Honor of Joseph F. O’Callaghan, 
ed. Donald J. Kagay (The Medieval Mediterranean 19; Leiden-Boston 1998) 
243-262, who gives some context to the Iberian situation that Egas was 
addressing. 
31 Richard H. Helmholz, ‘“Si quis suadente” (C.17 q.4 c.29): Theory and 
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grounds not covered explicitly by the canon for imposing a ban of 
excommunication on violators of all sorts:  If a person could have 
defended a cleric and did not.  The person who ordered attack. 
People who kicked, poured water, or tore the clothing of clerics. If 
someone locked clerics in their home and would not let them out.32 
 Egas added many other cases when ecclesiastical liberty was 
violated.  Many of his examples were drawn from the decretals 
that we have just discussed.  He added a few interesting cases.  If 
men violated a female cleric who wore a habit, they and any other 
participants in the crime will have their goods confiscated. The 
goods will be bestowed on the monastery of the victim.33  Further, 
perpetrators will be condemned to death.  He also laid down the 
norms governing sanctuary, which had become a principle of 
ecclesiastical liberty.  Churches, monasteries, and their cemeteries 
could provide immunity to free persons or slaves if they fear death 
or torture.  They cannot be taken from these places unless they 
were public and well-known criminals.34 
 There seems to have been a hiatus between Egas’ monograph 
and the tracts of jurists who began to explore ‘libertas 
ecclesiastica’ intensively during the last quarter of the fifteenth 
century.  This monographic literature burgeoned into a substantial 
series of texts that defended clerics and churches from secular 
authorities until well into the eighteenth century.35  The first 
                                                         
the first comprehensive canon on lay violence against the clergy at the Second 
Lateran Council, c.15 in modern editions. 
32 García y García, Estudios 258-259. 
33 Ibid. 262. 
34 Ibid. 268.  See Karl Blaine Shoemaker, Sanctuary and Crime in the Middle 
Ages: 400-1500 (Just Ideas: Transfomative Ideals of Justice in Ethical and 
Political Thought (New York 2011) and William Chester Jordan, ‘A Fresh Look 
at Medieval Sanctuary’, Law and the Illicit in Medieval Europe edd. Ruth Mazo 
Karras, Joel B. Kaye, Ann Matter (The Middle Ages;  Philadelphia 2008) 1-6.    
35 Perhaps one of the most important of these texts was Alessandro Ambrosini’s 
(ca. 1608), who wrote a detailed commentary on a decretal of Pope Gregory 
XIV, Commentaria in bullam Gregorii XIV De immunitate et libertate 
ecclesiastica (Parma 1608, reprinted in 1612 and 1621).  I have not found any 
literature on Ambrosini even though he also published cases that were heard in 
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printed tract on ‘Libertas ecclesiastica’ was probably written by 
Heinrich Urdemann (ca. 1420-†1485)  in the form of a dialogue 
between Hugo, Cato, and Oliverius.36  It was printed for the first 
time in 1477 and seems to have become a popular tract since it was 
reprinted in 1478, 1479, 1482-1483, 1484-1488.  Urdemann 
constructed a debate about ecclesiastical privileges that had been 
given to institutions in the small Belgian town of Tienen. 
 Nicholas (†1480), bishop of Modruš in Croatia a few years later 
wrote a tract he entitled Defensio libertatis ecclesiasticae.37  
Nicholas dedicated the tract to Cardinal Raffaello Riario and wrote 
it circa 1479.38  Later he willed his library to Pope Sixtus IV (1471-
1484).39  In his tract Nicholas deplored the mistreatment of 
ecclesiastical prelates and praised popes who had fought 
(decertare) for ecclesiastical possessions, and especially Sixtus’s 
deeds and his war against the Turks.40  He concluded his treatise 
with a section filled with fulsome praise for Sixtus’ pontificate.41  
 Why was ecclesiastical liberty an important theme at the Fifth 
Lateran Council when earlier councils between Lateran IV and 
Lateran V had ignored the issue?  An easy explanation of these 
changes would be the turmoil and anxieties about schism and 
heresies at the dawn of the Reformation.  However, as Johannes 
Andreae noted, Catholic princes and governments could be just as 
troublesome for the Church as entrenched dissenters.  Certainly, 
religious dissent in the early sixteenth century helped to shape the 
agenda at the Fifth Lateran Council. However, Catholic lay 
resistance to ecclesiastical authority had been prevalent in the 
                                                         
36Hubert Höing, ‘Dr. jur. Heinrich Urdemann (ca. 1420-1485: Kurienpro-
kurator, Offizial, Stiftsdechant und kaiserlicher Rat: Zur Karriere eines 
voreformatorischen Klerikers in Bocholt, Köln und Rom’, Annalen des 
Historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein 218 (2015) 105-150.   
37 Giovanni Mercati, ‘Notizie varie sopra Niccolò Modrussiense’, Opere 
minori, 4: 1917-1936 (Studi e testi 79; Città del Vaticano 1937) 205-267. 
38Ibid. 207, 211  My thanks to Professor Antonin Kalous, University of 
Olomouc for drawing my attention to this tract and giving me his notes on Vat. 
lat. 8092, fol.1r-68r. 
39 Mercati, ‘Notizie’ 208-212; see Egmont Lee, Sixtus IV and Men of Letters 
(Temi e testi 26; Roma 1978) 115, 195. 
40 Vat. lat. 8092, fol. 2r-5r, 14v. 
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fifteenth century.  Several fifteenth-century councils legislated 
against Catholic infringements of ecclesiastical liberties.42   Even 
so, as one wades through the canons and text of previous councils 
and the texts of canon law one could not foresee the vigorous 
emergence of the theme of ecclesiastical liberty at the Fifth 
Lateran Council.   
 The Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges was certainly one of the 
reasons, perhaps the primary reason, that was responsible for 
‘ecclesiastica libertas’ becoming a prominent issue at Lateran V.  
A council of French clergy in Bourges gathered with the purpose 
of reforming the French church.  The prelates and clergy drew 
upon the canons promulgated at the  Council of Basel (1431-1438)  
as a source for their reforms.  King Charles VII of France was 
pleased with the results and incorporated their decisions into a 
royal ordinance on July 7, 1438 that was entitled the Pragmatic 
Sanction of Bourges.  When Pope Julius II summoned the Church 
to a council at the Lateran one of his primary preoccupations was 
the Pragmatic Sanction and its damage to ecclesiastical liberties.    
 Julius’ distaste for the Pragmatic Sanction is palpable in the 
letter, Saluti gregis, that he addressed to the Council’s fourth 
session on the 10th of December 1512.43  The king’s use of the 
term, ‘pragmatica sanctio,’ was a poke in the papal eye.  The 
terminology evolved in late Roman law and defined a law that was 
issued to a public, not private, group or institution; in this case the 
ordinance was promulgated for the Kingdom of France.44  Julius 
complained that for a long time French prelates and noble laymen 
had infringed on the liberty and authority of the pope, the Roman 
church, and the sacred canons because of the Pragmatic Sanction.  
Although King Louis XI had revoked it, Julius did not consider 
the royal revocation enough because it had not been confirmed by 
French parlements.  The pope posted his summons to the French 
                                                         
42 Council of Angers 1448 (secular legislation), Mansi 32.89-90; Council of 
Toledo (transitus [travel] and ecclesiastical property) 1471, Mansi 32.398-400; 
Council of Senones 1485 (rights), Mansi 32.409; Council of Magdeburg 1489 
(protection from secular authorities), Mansi 32.458, 473.  
43 Fifth Lateran’s proceedings are edited by Nelson H. Minnich, ‘Concilium 
lateranense V 1512-1517’, COGD 2.2.1317-1455 at 1349-1351.  





 ECCLESIASTICAL LIBERTY  195 
and his condemnation of the ordinance on the doors of the 
churches in Milan, Asti, and Pavia, because, as he explained, 
France was too dangerous for representatives of the pope.45  
  Four years later Pope Leo X returned to the issue of the 
Pragmatic Sanction on December 19, 1516 at the eleventh session 
of the Council.46 In Pastor aeternus Leo repeated Julius’ 
condemnation and railed again against the ordinance’s violation of 
ecclesiastical liberty.  His letter then took another turn.  Leo 
admitted that the summons posted on the doors of three Italian 
churches were not adequate legally.  He had probably been told by 
his curial jurists that Julius’ summons did not conform to the 
norms of canonical jurisprudence.  A summons, the canonists had 
agreed for three centuries, could not be omitted under any 
circumstances because it was required by natural law.   Leo 
explained that the prelates, clergy, monasteries, and chapters 
claimed various impediments that prevented their obedience.  Leo 
and his jurists knew that their claims could not be ignored.  
Canonical jurisprudence forbade it.  Leo claimed that after Julius’ 
death the summons to the French were ‘legitimately’ repeated but 
gave no proof that they now conformed to canonical norms.47 
Nonetheless, he annulled the Pragmatic Sanction.  He noted that 
no council had been legitimately held in the seventy years since 
the Sanction had been promulgated.  Consequently, the Fifth 
Lateran Council was the first opportunity the Church had to 
abrogate the decree. He based his authority to abrogate the 
Sanction on Pope Boniface VIII’s decretal Unam sanctam.48  He 
tempered his claim with the same caveat that the French Pope 
Clement V used to placate King Philip the Fair in 1306, a decretal 
with the incipit Meruit carissimi filii.49  Clement had assured 
Philip that Unam sanctam did not prejudice the relationship of the 
Kingdom of France to the Roman church.  The relationship 
between the kingdom and Rome would remain the same as it had 
                                                         
45 COGD 2.2.1349-1351 lines 625-631, 654-658. 
46 COGD 2.2.1434-1442. 
47 COGD  2.2.1436, lines3503-3504: ‘citatio legitime executa’. 
48 Extravagantes communes  1.8.1. 
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been before Unam sanctam.  Leo made the same promise.   What 
did Clement’s and now Leo’s promise mean in the sixteenth 
century?  We will never know because no canonist ever glossed 
Meruit.  In any case, the Fifth Lateran Council was the first and 
the last council to cite Boniface’s controversial decretal. 
 Leo closed his letter with a list of people and offices who would 
be subject to a major excommunication if they respected or 
adhered to the terms of the Pragmatic Sanction directly or 
indirectly.  Ecclesiastical liberty was preserved.  As Minnich’s 
new edition of the Council’s proceedings illustrates, Leo 
simultaneously issued the Concordat of Bologna to define the 
relationship between the papacy and France.50  At the end of his 
letter on the Concordat, Leo concluded that if there were any 
customs, statutes, or practices in the Kingdom of France that 
infringed upon ecclesiastical liberty, this agreement did not 
approve them.51 
 In session nine that was held on May 5, 1514, Pope Leo dealt 
with another important issue: the safety of ecclesiastics and others 
who travelled to the Council. The legal concept, safe conduct 
(salvusconductus) and freedom of passage seems to have been 
born in the customary law of Northern Europe and did not enter 
the Ius commune until the late fourteenth century.   The term, 
salvusconductus did not exist in earlier Roman and canon law.52  
The idea that all human beings should have the right to travel to 
any place they wished to go was very old.53  However, it had not 
been an issue for those who had been summoned to church 
councils or to secular representative assemblies.  The Church had 
long struggled with lay princes who detained, captured, or 
                                                         
50 COGD 12.2.408-1434. 
51 COGD 2.2.1429, lines 3264-3269. 
52 In a decretal of Pope Innocent III in 1205, the same concept is expressed as 
‘securus conductus’, 3 Comp. 2.3.4 (X 2.6.4). 
53 See Pennington, ‘Sovereignty and Rights  in  Medieval and Early Modern 
Jurisprudence: Law and Norms without a State’, Roman Law as Formative of 
Modern Legal Systems: Studies in Honour of Wiesaw Litewski.  Edd. J. Sondel, 
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imprisoned papal legates travelling in their territories.54  In spite 
of these occasional difficulties, the idea of granting papal legates, 
bishops, or clerics a right of safe conduct seems never to have 
arisen.  The issue of safe passages at Constance and Basel was not 
to protect ecclesiastical liberty but was a legal solution for 
bringing religious dissenters to the councils.  Canonical norms 
dictated that they could not, as we have seen, be judged in absentia.  
The Emperor Sigismund gave John Hus a vaguely worded safe 
conduct for the Council of Constance.55  The Council of Basel 
gave safe conduct passes in their decrees to representatives from 
Bohemia and Constantinople to attend its sessions.56   Rather than 
being examples of ecclesiastical liberty, Constance and Basel were 
attempts to conform conciliar actions and proceedings to the strict 
norms of canonical procedure.  Their cases could not be heard and 
decisions could not be rendered at the council without their 
presence. 
 The development of ‘salvusconductus’ seems to be an example 
of practice preceding theory.  If we can trust the sources it was an 
important royal instrument from the twelfth century on in 
Northern Europe.  A very early example of a safe conduct being 
given dates to 1189.  Roger of Hoveden reported that Philip of 
Flanders granted King Richard of England a safe conduct to 
Calais.57  The records of the Tower of London record many safe 
conducts granted for various reasons in the early fourteenth 
century.  The earliest is dated 1311.58 John, the abbot of Cluny, 
                                                         
54 Papal legates constantly faced secular violence in the period from 1000-1500, 
e.g. Trevor Dean, ‘Rise of the signori’, The New Cambridge Medieval History, 
c.1198- c.1300, ed. David Abulafia  (Volume 5; Cambridge 1999) 459-460 and 
in other essays of the volume pp. 136, 387, 392.  
55 Thomas A. Fudge, The Trial of Jan Hus:  Medieval Heresy and Criminal 
Procedure (Oxford 2013) 260, with the literature he cites. 
56 CODG 2.2778-782, 981-986. 
57 Chronica Magistri Roger de Houedene, ed. William Stubbs (3 vols. 
Cambridge 2012) 3.28; see also 215, 244. 
58 Rotuli scotiae in turri londinensi et in domo capitulari westmonasteriensi 
asservari, 1: Temporibus regum Angliae Edwardi I. Edwardi II. Edwardi III. 
(London: 1814) 108, 120, 125, 127, and passim. The ‘rotuli’ records numerous 
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asked for a ‘salvus conductus’ for his monks who were to negotiate 
a contract with Sir Gilbert Talbot in Calais 1392.  He asked that 
Talbot petition a safe conduct from King Richard II or from the 
governor of Calais.59  Baldus de Ubaldis (†1400) is the earliest 
jurist known to me who used ‘salvusconductus’ in the legal 
literature of the Ius commune before Constance.  In an undated 
consilium Baldus wrote about a case in which the city of Asti had 
issued a safe conduct to Thomas and Manfredus that they could 
enter the city with an armed retinue.  Later Manfredus sent his wife 
into the city with another armed band of retainers.  She was 
arrested and her followers’ weapons and goods confiscated.  
Baldus wrote a consilium in the wife’s defense and concluded that 
a safe conduct covered the wife citing primarily Roman law 
principles.60  Baldus’ conclusion that a safe conduct covered wives 
was expanded in Lateran V’s decree to include all members of a 
traveler’s household.61  If Asti was issuing safe conducts, other 
Italian cities also were.  In any case these documents and Baldus’ 
consilium is evidence that the legal instrument for protecting 
litigants was fairly commonplace by 1400. 
 The safe conduct that Pope Leo mandated in session nine at the 
Fifth Lateran opened a completely new legal issue.  The safe 
conduct was no longer only a protection provided to litigants or 
travelers who could be arrested or imprisoned without one, it was 
also a benefit or a grace bestowed by the prince on his subjects.  
The Council of Trent granted safe conducts to German Protestants 
who wished to attend the Council.62  These safe conducts were not 
the same general grants of privilege that Lateran V had 
inaugurated.  Later criminal jurists concentrated on defining safe 
                                                         
la Société des Antiquaires de la Normandie (2nd Series, 5th vol. Paris 1846) 157, 
216-234 and passim. 
59 Charters and Records among the Archives of the Ancient Abbe of Cluni (sic), 
from 1077 to 1534, ed. G.F. Duckett (sine loco 1888) volume 1.135-136. 
60 BAV Barberini lat. 1406, fol. 5r-5v; printed in volume one of his consilia 
(Milan 1494) number 109 (unfoliated). 
61 Prospero Farinacci, Fragmentorum variorum quaestionum et communium 
opinionum criminalium pars secunda (Nüremberg ca. 1690) 90 number 607. 
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conducts almost entirely as a part of criminal proceedings, 
especially connected to a summons to attend a trial.63  However, 
the safe conduct as a protection for legates, ambassadors, and 
travelers gradually evolved into diplomatic immunity that is a key 
element of international law today.64  Lateran V can take some 
credit for playing a part in that development. 
 In session nine, the problem of lay violence against the clergy 
was again broached.   As we have seen, the Church had struggled 
with lay violence against clergy and against ecclesiastical property 
for centuries.65 It had been a key issue for ecclesiastical liberty 
since the twelfth century.   During the Second Lateran Council of 
1139 Pope Innocent II (1130-1143) promulgated Si quis suadente 
that was immediately incorporated into the last recension of 
Gratian’s Decretum.66 Johannes Teutonicus, who wrote the 
Ordinary Gloss to the canon (ca. 1217), compiled a laundry list of 
exceptions to the norm that a layman could not attack a cleric.   
Self-defense was the most important.  A layman could always 
justly defend himself against an attack by a cleric.  A layman could 
attack a cleric if he  found his wife, mother, sister or daughter in 
bed with a cleric.  In those and other cases Johannes thought a 
layman could strike a cleric with impunity.67 Later jurists posed 
even more subtle questions.  At the end of the thirteenth century 
Guido de Baysio asked if a layman should be excommunicated if 
                                                         
63 The literature is extensive.  See e.g.  Marcantonio Savelli, Summa diversorum 
tractatuum (4 vols. Venice 1715) 4.73-76; Jacobus Menochius, De arbitrariis 
iudicum, quaestionibus et causis (Cologny 1630) 612-617 (consilia 436-437) 
64 See Albericus Gentilis, De iure belli libri tres, ed. Thomas Erskine Holland 
(Oxford 1877) 185-192 and Willem van der Meulen’s extensive commentary 
on Grotius, Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres (Amsterdam 1704) 
3.14, p.271;  Montell Ogdon, ‘The Growth of Purpose in the Law of Diplomatic 
Immunity’, American Journal of International Law  31 (1937) 449-465; for a 
general history of the subject see Marsha L. Frey and Linda Frey, The History 
of Diplomatic Immunity (Columbus 1999).  The legal background and sources 
of diplomatic immunity have not yet been studied. 
65 Richard H. Helmholz, The Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 
597 to the 1640s (The Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1; Oxford 2004) 
505-508 and his earlier study cited above. 
66 Second Lateran c.15 = C.17 q.4 c.29. 





200 KENNETH PENNINGTON 
he seized a cleric’s horse to escape his enemies by violently throw-
ing him off it.  Tancred of Bologna had thought the layman should 
be excommunicated, but his penalty should be milder and no 
penance should be imposed on him.  Guido argued the layman had 
acted according to the law.  He was under duress and in times of 
necessity all things were held in common.68 
 By the beginning of the sixteenth century clerical immunity 
from lay violence was embedded deeply in the jurisprudence of 
the Ius commune.  The Fifth Lateran canon, Supernae dispositionis 
arbitrio expanded clerical immunity and ecclesiastical liberty.69  It 
renewed Pope Boniface VIII’s decretal Felicis recordationis that 
dealt with violence against the cardinals and endorsed Pope 
Clement V’s decretal, Si quis suadente diabolo, whose incipit 
echoed the beginning of the Second Lateran Council’s canon, and 
which focused on violence against bishops.70  From a legal point 
of view, renewing these two older decretals was redundant.  They 
had attracted extensive commentaries and had been long included 
in the Corpus iuris canonici.  Leo emphasized that he wished to 
renovate all the papal decretals that had been issued in favor of 
ecclesiastical liberty.71  He especially mentioned In coena Domini 
as being important for punishing the violators of ecclesiastical 
liberties.72 
 It may have been Leo’s primary purpose to insert In coena 
Domini into conciliar legislation.  The bull was a cornucopia of 
ecclesiastical liberties and privileges that had the protection of the 
pope.  First published by Pope Urban V in 1363, it was republished 
by Gregory XI (1372), Martin V (1420), and by Julius II just 
                                                         
68 Guido de Baysio, Rosarium (Venice 1480) to C.17 q.4 c.29 unfoliated: ‘Si 
quis nam necessitatis tempore debent omnia esse communia, xlvii. di. Sicut hi 
(c.8). preterea iste fecit ob tutelam corporis sui, ergo videtur iure fecisse.  Ergo 
non dicitur fecisse diabolo suadente’.  On the concept of ‘communis omnium 
possessio’, see Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural 
Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150-1625 (Emory University Studies in 
Law and Religion.  Atlanta, Georgia 1997) 69-76. 
69 COGD 2.2.1389-1390. 
70 VI 5.9.5 and Clementines 5.8.1. 
71 COGD 2.2.1389, line 1999. 
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before he opened the Fifth Lateran Council.  Although it had been 
published regularly by previous popes, the decree had never been 
incorporated into canon law.  Pope Leo must have wanted its 
provisions to be a part of papal conciliar legislation.  Besides 
renewing Felicis recordationis and Si quis suadente, the Fifth 
Lateran’s canon also contained other ecclesiastical privileges.  
Secular authorities were forbidden to impose financial burdens on 
prelates and clerics and should not receive any contributions even 
if the clergy consented to the payment.  If prelates consent to these 
financial payments they will be excommunicated and removed 
from office.  Henceforth they were rendered incapable of any legal 
act and could not make a will.   
 A few years later Leo promulgated his version of In coena 
Domini in 1517.   His list of ecclesiastical liberties for the clergy 
and prelates was extensive.  He excommunicated those who 
impeded food destined for Rome and the Roman Curia and  those 
who robbed, detained, abused, mutilated, or killed persons’ 
exercising their offices in the Curia.  Those persons who mutilated, 
wounded, killed, captured or detained patriarchs, archbishops, 
bishops were also excommunicated.  He also excommunicated 
those who abused, mutilated, killed, or despoiled ecclesiastical or 
secular persons who had come to the Roman Curia to prosecute 
their cases. Their advocates, procurators, judges, or their delegates 
were also taken under the protection of the bull.  The same 
protection was given to pilgrims who came to Rome.  Like Lateran 
II’s provision, these excommunications could only be lifted by the 
pope.73  Leo’s bull repeated previous provisions of In coena 
Domini, but he clearly intended that the bull should circulate 
widely.  The printing press was an effective vehicle.  For the first 
time in the history of this papal bull, Pope Leo had it printed in 
Rome during April of 1517.74  The reissuing  of In coena Domini 
continued until Pope Clement XIV stopped reaffirming its 
publication in 1770 because of opposition from Catholics and 
Protestants. 
                                                         
73 Ibid. [pp.2-4] unpaginated. 
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 In the tenth session on May 4, 1515, the Council dealt with the 
issues of ecclesiastical exemptions for individuals and institutions, 
especially the exemptions from episcopal jurisdiction over 
monastic foundations and clerical crimes.75  Bernard de’ Rossi, 
bishop of Treviso, stepped up to the pulpit and read Leo’s canon, 
Regimini universalis ecclesiae.76  The letter was a very mixed 
message about ecclesiastical liberty.  Bernard declared that the 
pope had discovered many reports of canons’ having made claims 
of exemptions in various churches, secular and regular, from 
episcopal jurisdiction.  Under the cloak of immunity from 
episcopal jurisdiction, clerics had, however, committed crimes 
because they did not fear episcopal discipline.  Their crimes 
created scandal.  These criminal clerics who had papal exemptions 
should be punished by delegated authorities, but if these papal 
delegates neglected their duties the local ordinaries may intervene 
after proper legal warnings had been given publicly.77   
 The local bishops were given ambiguous instructions.  They 
could proceed through the inquisitorial or the accusatorial modes 
of proof. They could not, however, use torture in their 
proceedings.  They could examine the accused in person.  All the 
testimony should be sealed and nothing should be made public, 
unless there was a complaint that a proper summons had not be 
served.  The written documents should then be sent to Rome at the 
expense of the defendants.78  Leo concluded by informing the local 
ordinaries that if the defendants were found to be guilty or if there 
                                                         
75 This is an issue with a long history of canonical jurisprudence; see 
Pennington, Pope and Bishops:  The Papal Monarchy in the Twelfth and 
Thirteenth Centuries (The Middle Ages; Philadelphia: 1984) 154-189 
especially at 177-186. 
76 Sacrum lateranense concilium novissimum sub Iulio ii et Leone x celebratum, 
ed. Antonio Maria Ciocchi del Monte (Rome 1520) fol. 147v: ‘Deinde 
reverendus pater Dominus Bernardus Episcopus Taruisinus  ascendit ambonem 
et legit contra exemptos cedulam et alias materias ecclesiasticam libertatem et 
dignitatem episcopalem concernentes cuius tenor talis est’. 
77 COGD 2.2.1394-1400 at 1394-1395. 
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were sufficient evidence to torture them to discover the truth, the 
local ordinary may render a decision according to what was just.79 
 This was the first and only time that a papal council mandated 
or even mentioned torture.  No council had ever declared that 
torture was a permissible procedure in ecclesiastical courts.  
Although ecclesiastical courts were not permitted to use severe 
forms of torture, there was a growing acceptance of the milder 
forms of torture in the inquisitions into heresy and in some other 
criminal cases.80  There is some visual evidence that episcopal 
courts used torture in the fourteenth century.  In a Decretum 
manuscript ca. 1300 that was produced in Southern France, there 
is a vivid illumination of a bishop conducting the torture on a 
tonsured cleric with a method of torture known as La corda 
(Figure 1).81  The torturer wears a lay person’s hat.  A cleric is 
shown being tortured.  The division of the illumination into two 
spaces seems to imply that the judicial process took place in the 
episcopal court, while the cleric was tortured outside it.  There are 
other Gratian manuscripts that illustrate the similar scenes.82  All 
the images employ La corda, which was the most commonly used 
form of torture in the judicial forum.  We do not yet have studies 
                                                         
79 Ibid. lines 2220-2222. 
80 See Henry Ansgar Kelly, ‘Judicial Torture in Canon Law and Church 
Tribunals:  From Gratian to Galileo’, CHR 101 (2015) 754-793, argues that 
torture was used in ecclesiastical courts, especially in the case of heresy but also 
for other crimes in the fourteenth century on.  He presents no evidence on its 
frequency but relies on inquisitorial manuals. 
81 On La corda see Pennington, ‘Women on the Rack:  Torture and Gender in 
the Ius commune’, Recto ordine procedit magister: Liber amicorum E.C. 
Coppens, edited by Jan Hallebeek, Louis Berkvens, Georges Martyn, and Paul 
Nève (Iuris Scripta Historica 28; Brussels 1212) 243-257 at 249. 
82 Avignon, Bibliothèque de la ville 659, fol. 189v; Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat. 
Fol. 4, fol. 176r, Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Ham. 279, fol. 99v, Escorial, Real 
Biblioteca del Escorial, ç.I.4, fol. 205v. a London manuscript in private 
ownership, see Maria Alessandra Bilotta, ‘Le Décret de Gratien:  Un manuscript 
de droit canonique toulousain reconstitué’,  Art de’l’emluminure 24 (2008) 10, 
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exploring the frequency of torture in ecclesiastical courts.83  We 
do know that secular courts employed torture infrequently.84   
 Regimini universalis ecclesiae begs for interpretation.  There 
was no existing jurisprudence in canon law that might have 
answered basic questions that the canon raised, e.g. which crimes 
fell under the canon and which clergy could be summoned are only 
the most elementary.  There was a lot of jurisprudence on other 
questions. What type of evidence was necessary before a 
defendant could be tortured?  Was ‘sufficientia indicia,’ the 
terminology of Regimini universalis ecclesiae, different from the 
more standard terminology, ‘vehementes, indubitata,  manifesta 
indicia?’  We will never know the answers to those questions 
because the council forbade every Christian from glossing and 
interpretation of the canons without papal approval under the 
penalty of automatic excommunication.85  This prohibition was 
unprecedented.  Not since Justinian had any ruler forbidden jurists 
to interpret legal texts.86 
 At the end of Regimini universalis ecclesiae Leo turned from 
the rights of prelates and returned to the issue of ecclesiastical 
liberty of clerics.87  Leo declared that no power (facultas) had been 
given to laymen that they might exercise over clerics or over 
ecclesiastical property.  He renewed all the constitutions in the 
Corpus iuris canonici that dealt with tithes, plunders of 
ecclesiastical property, arsonists, pillagers of fields, laymen who 
seize cardinals, bishops, and other clerics, or anyone who took 
away the jurisdiction rights of clerics.  He emphasized that laymen 
                                                         
83 A court case in Perugia raised the question whether a cleric should be tortured 
in a case in which he had claimed self-defense.  The argumentation in the case 
presumed that if the evidence were adequate, the cleric could be tortured.  
However, it is not clear from the decision if the cleric was in orders.  See 
Decisiones fori episcopalis perusini 265-271. 
84 Pennington, ‘Torture and Fear:  Enemies of Justice’, RIDC 19 (2008) 203-
242.  My thanks to Joanna Fronska for her comments on these illuminations. 
85 Session 12, March 16, 1517,  COGD 2.2.1453 lines 4086-4089. 
86 With the exception of Pope Nicholas III who forbade that his constitution 
Exiit qui seminat (VI 5.12.3) be glossed; his prohibition was abrogated a short 
time later by Pope John XXII. See also Sinisi, ‘Tridentine Decrees’ 211-212 
227-228 et passim below in this volume.  





 ECCLESIASTICAL LIBERTY  205 
should have no rights to compel or interfere with the bestowing of 
ecclesiastical benefices.  All of these crimes damage ecclesiastical 
liberty.  Therefore the pope ordered all secular rulers to obey these 
constitutions and to command their subjects to do the same.  Any 
contrary customs were void.  Leo’s list of offences and references 
to earlier canonical norms would have given the teachers of canon 
law much to discuss if they had been permitted to do so.   
 What conclusions can be drawn from this evidence about the 
Fifth Lateran Council and its fostering of ecclesiastical liberties?  
Giuseppe Alberigo’s short introduction to his edition of the 
Council’s canons does not make any claims for its importance.  In 
his introduction to the latest edition of the canons, Nelson Minnich 
points out that the abrogation of the Pragmatic Sanction of 
Bourges was Leo’s success.  However, he also notes that most 
bishops opposed the council’s closure.  They thought the work of 
the Council was not done.  Minnich observes that Trent followed 
Lateran V by not permitting its canons to be glossed.88 This 
prohibition led to a crucial change in the status and importance of 
the schools of canon law.  From the point of view of a historian of 
canon law, Lateran V and its pedisequus Trent, were responsible 
for diminishing the importance of canonical jurisprudence as a 
source of law and as a source of norms and principles in the 
Church.  It is not by chance that the last collection of papal 
decretals was published before Lateran V.  All attempts to compile 
collections of papal legislation after Lateran V failed.  Various 
jurists worked on a Liber Septimus of decretals.89  Their efforts 
were not successful.  These collections included canons from 
Lateran V and from Trent.  That may be one reason for their 
                                                         
88 COGD 2.2.1453, lines 4088 and Minnich’s Introduction to his edition of the 
canons in CODG 2.2.1324. 
89 Elisabeth Dickerhoff-Borello, Ein Liber Septimus für das Corpus iuris 
canonici: Der Versuch einer nachtridentinischen Kompilation (Forschungen 
zur kirchlichen Rechtsgeschichte und zum Kirchenrecht 27; Köln-Weimar-
Wien 2002) and Lorenzo Sinisi, Oltre il Corpus iuris canonici:  Iniziative 
manualistiche e progetti di nuove compilazioni in età post-tridentina (Collana 
della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell’Università degli Studi Magna Graecia di 
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failure.90  In any case, Leo X’s and Pope Pius IV’s prohibitions 
against commentary and glossing of conciliar canons cast a pall 
over the future of canonistic jurisprudence. The damage has lasted 
for centuries.  Creative canonical jurisprudence died as a source of 
law within the Church and as an influential system of 
jurisprudence outside it.  It would take another essay to defend that 
last generalization.  Its truth can be found in the scholarship of the 
last fifty years in which scholars have illustrated in great detail the 
importance of canonical jurisprudence for shaping the Ius 
commune, which in turn has formed the bedrock of modern 
jurisprudence.91   
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90 Dickerhoff-Borello, Liber Septimus 235-242, whose conclusions about the 
‘Interpretationsverbot’ are opaque.   
91 The list of scholars who have contributed to exploring and illustrating the 
importance of medieval canonical jurisprudence for shaping modern law is 
very long.  To mention only a few names:  Brian Tierney, Richard Helmholz, 
Ennio Cortese, Jean Gaudemet, Walter Ullmann, James Muldoon, John T. 
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Figure 1. Gratian, Decretum C.15,  
Amiens, Bibliothèque municipale 355, fol. 208v 
 
